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Abstract
Counterpossibles, counterfactuals conditional with impossible antecedents, are notoriously 
contested; while the standard view makes them trivially true, some authors argue that they 
can be non-trivially true. In this paper, I examine the use of counterfactuals in the context 
of games, and argue that there is a case to be made for their non-triviality in a restricted  
sense. In particular, I examine the case of retro problems in chess, where it can happen that  
one  is  tasked  with  evaluating  counterfactuals  about  illegal  positions.  If  we  understand 
illegality  as  a  type  of  restricted  impossibility,  those  counterfactuals  are  non-trivial 
counterpossibles. I suggest that their non-triviality stems from their role in practices of rule  
coordination  and  revision,  and  suggest  that  this  model  could  be  generalized  to 
counterpossibles  in different domains.  I  then compare the approach to  the accounts  of 
Vetter (2016) and Locke (2019).
Keywords:  Counterpossibles,  Games,  Retro  problems,  Constitutive  and  regulative 
norms, Rule coordination and revision
There is an ongoing debate about the status of counterpossibles, counterfactuals with 
impossible antecedents. There are roughly two camps: one defends the view that 
counterpossibles  are  vacuously  true,  while  the  other  defends  the  view  that 
counterpossibles can be non-vacuously true or false.1 One of the main motivations 
for the non-vacuity position is the defense of a series of metaphysical views (Nolan 
(2014) gives an overview of the many topics in which counterpossibles might play a 
crucial  role).  However,  metaphysics  is  contentious  enough  that  the  case  for 
counterpossible non-vacuity has remained inconclusive. Recently, some authors who 
defend  non-vacuity  have  tried  the  different  strategy  to  show that  there  are  less 
contentious independent contexts in which it is necessary to distinguish between the 
truth value or acceptability of counterpossibles. For example, Baron, Colyvan, and 
Ripley (2017) argue that there can be genuine mathematical counterpossibles, and 
Tan (2019) argues that there can be genuine counterpossibles in the natural sciences. 
Without holding an opinion on whether those applications of the strategy work, the 
main aim of this paper is to examine whether this strategy can pan out in the context  
of games and play. I will argue that the strategy does indeed work in this context, 
1 Lewis (1973), Williamson (2007), Emery and Hill (2016) and Vetter (2016) defend the 
orthodoxy. Nolan (1997), Kim and Maslen (2006), Brogaard and Salerno (2013), Kment 
(2006), Priest (2016), Berto et al. (2018), Locke (2019), Tan (2019), and Berto and Jago 
(2019) defend non-vacuity.
albeit with significant restrictions. By observing how counterfactuals behave in the 
context of games, we can get indirect evidence about whether this strategy can be 
useful more broadly. If we can only account for counterpossibles with restrictions 
even  in  the  case  of  games,  there  might  be  restrictions  also  for  the  use  of 
counterpossibles in different contexts.2
1. Some generalities about counterfactuals in games
Reasoning in  the  context  of  games is  often  explicitly  conditional reasoning.  For 
concreteness,  take  chess.  Planning  a  move  involves  reasoning  about  the 
consequences of the move: if we move a pawn to a certain position, the king will be 
exposed; if we castle, the attacker will have to move their knights to a certain area of 
the board if we want to push from this side; and so on. The conditionals that are 
evaluated  in  the  context  of  play  encode  information  about  the  outcomes  of 
hypothetical  scenarios  where strategic choices  are made,  and they can be highly 
complex: in multi-player games, they are often not only about the direct effects of 
actions in the game state, but also about the beliefs of other participants of the game 
about the game itself: ‘if I move this piece here, my opponent will think that I plan  
to do this, so he will…’.
While some of the relevant conditionals in game playing are indicative (as in the 
examples I just gave), it can be equally common to reason using counterfactuals of 
the form:
1) If A were to happen, B would happen.
There is a rich literature on counterfactual reasoning in the context of games from 
the perspective of  game theoretical  issues  (cf. Binmore (1987),  Bicchieri  (1988), 
Stalnaker (1996) and Skyrms (1998)). For example, we can describe the prisoner’s 
dilemma in counterfactual terms: in that formulation, it is about what would happen 
if a number or individuals were made to choose between cooperating or defecting 
against each other, given certain payoffs. The use of counterfactuals instead of future 
indicative  conditionals  seems  to  provide  greater  flexibility,  since  it  allows  the 
evaluation of situations that are detached from the current circumstances. Think of 
the different contexts in which we would use the conditionals ‘if Liam doesn’t kick 
the ball to the right, someone else will’ and ‘if Liam hadn’t kicked the ball to the  
right,  someone  else  would  have’.  Clearly,  there  are  contexts  in  which  the  truth 
conditions of these conditionals diverge.3
Counterfactual reasoning in the context of games can be also backwards looking, 
in case where what we are talking about isn’t the outcome of an action, but what 
explained the action:
2) If A had happened, B would have happened.4
2 The topic of counterpossibles in games is interesting also from a different perspective. 
One could defend the non-vacuity of counterpossibles from an anti-realist perspective by 
treating counterpossible-talk as a kind of game or fiction (cf. Kim and Maslen (2006)). 
Our discussion here could also bear on the scope of this research direction.
3 It is important to observe, with Lewis (1973, 4), that there are apparently subjunctive  
conditionals which have the same truth conditions as indicative conditionals, so that the  
apparent use of subjunctive conditionals in reasoning does not immediately entail that we 
are dealing with counterfactual reasoning.
4 In contexts where one could produce this conditional, it might be possible to also produce 
the  conditional  expressions  ‘if  A happened,  B  must  have  happened’,  ‘given  that  A 
For  example,  given  a  surprising  event  in  a  game,  we  might  reason  about  what 
explained it, so that we can then evaluate our future strategy. In some contexts we 
also might want to evaluate backwards looking counterfactuals for reasons that don’t 
bear on future play at all. I will assume that both forward and backward looking 
counterfactual can be given a unified account.5
2. Counterpossibles in games
Ordinarily, we only consider game counterfactuals with possible antecedents. This is 
reasonable because we are interested in problems of evaluating courses of action, 
where the possibility of acting on the information given by those evaluations matters 
(a different way of putting this point is that when reasoning counterfactually when 
playing  games,  we  are  looking  for  guidance).  However,  this  is  not  decisive  on 
whether there couldn’t be cases where we evaluate counterfactuals with impossible 
antecedents. In principle, it is possible for judgements about what we ought to do to 
be independent of judgements about what would happen, even though in many cases 
it is clear that our judgements about what we ought to do are informed by what we 
believe would happen.6 Pushing this line of thought would force us to take a stance 
on a whole host of difficult issues.7 Instead, we should examine whether there can be 
direct counterexamples to the restriction of having possible antecedents.
Consider the following chess board:
Two questions: a) how can we proceed from this position to a win? b) how did 
we arrive at the current position? I will leave the former aside. The second question 
is characteristic of retrograde (or “retro”) analysis.8 During retro analysis, one can 
make counterfactual judgments like
3) If white were in this position, the bishop in g1 would have, at some point in 
the course of the game, moved from h2 or along the a7-g1 diagonal.9
happened, B must have happened’.
5 Cf. Bennett (2003 ch. 18) for a defense.
6 Sinnott-Armstrong (1984) raises this possibility about the ‘ought implies can’ principle,  
which he takes to be a mere conversational  implicature.  In his view,  while  someone 
literally could be obligated to do something that they wouldn’t be able to do, it would be 
pointless to say that they ought to do it because such saying wouldn’t provide advice.
7 Cf. the  debate  between  Streumer  (2007)  and  Heuer  (2010)  on  whether  there  can  be 
reasons to do or try the impossible.
8 Smullyan (1979) is the most accessible introduction to retrograde analysis.
9 It is plausible that a seasoned player or problem solver would recognize the impossibility 
of  the  board  visually or  imaginatively instead  of  relying  on  explicit  counterfactual 
Now, it turns out that it is impossible to arrive at this position during actual play 
(that is, in a game that begins from the standard starting position). I will call this 
type  of  impossibility  chess-impossibility.10 Chess-impossible  positions  are  also 
called illegal (cf. the FIDE’s laws of chess (2018, 3.10.3)).11 The relevant modality 
pertains to states of a game, although there is closely related modality that pertains 
to game-plays (which in the case of chess are sequences of states, but in other cases  
can be processes in a richer sense). In this paper I will limit myself to the discussion  
of chess-impossibility in the stative sense only, but I think that much of what I will 
say here can be applied to the process conception of possibility. In any case, there 
should be a closely related counterfactual that says:
4) If the board had come to be in this position, the bishop in g1 would have, at 
some point in the course of the game, moved from  h2 or along the  a7-g1 
diagonal.
The  antecedent  of  the  counterfactual  is  chess-impossible,  so  we  classify  the 
counterfactual as chess-counterpossible.
How  to  evaluate  counterfactuals  like  (4)?  It  is  usually  recognized  that 
counterfactual evaluation is always performed against the background of some body 
of relevant assumptions. This body of assumptions is fixed by the context, which in 
turn is fixed by the task at hand. In the case of (4) we should presumably include 
assumptions about the rules of chess in this background; for example, that the bishop 
moves diagonally an arbitrary number of free spaces, and that the starting position of 
white’s bishops is c1 and f1. Since we know that bishops move diagonally and that 
the bishop in  g1 could not have started in its current position (call it P), the last 
move of the piece could have only initiated at either a position in the diagonals a7-
g1 or  h2-g1 (this is something that we can deduce or imagine). It is at this point 
that we could judge that if P were to happen, it would have followed such move 
(since they are the only apparently possible moves); that is, we could be disposed to 
accept . However, in both diagonals there are pawns blocking the bishop, which we 
also know couldn’t  have moved from their initial  positions (pawns do not move 
backwards). So the bishop couldn’t have arrived at  g1 from either direction, since 
reasoning. Cf. the psychological literature on chess cognition tracing back to De Groot 
(n.d.) and Chase and Simon (1973).
10 For a more formal treatment of chess-possibility, see the appendix.
11 Dawson  and  Hundsdorfer  (1915,  p.  9)  make  an  interesting  distinction  between 
impossibility and illegality:
We use with forethought the word  illegal to define any condition which could 
not arise in actual play. The word impossible is often used in the same sense, but 
it  is  not  satisfactory,  and  we  shall  not  use  it.  There  is  no  such  thing  as  an  
impossible position, provided you have enough chess-men in your box to draw 
on. The word always provoked Sam Loyd. “Impossible?” he would say, “you 
say these men could not have got into such a position! Why, they  are in that 
position; I put them there myself!” To this no answer can be made.
Dawson and Hundsdorfer’s point is that all chess diagrams are constructible, whereas not all 
of  those possible  diagrams are legal or could happen in actual  play.  The size of the  
possibility spaces is vastly different: roughly speaking, there are 1071 possible diagrams, 
and while the number of possible legal positions is an open question, it is widely believed 
to be within the 1040 to 1050 range. Cf. Steinerberger (2015).
Sam Loyd (1841–1911) was a well-known chess problem composer and puzzle creator. For a 
very interesting overview of  his position on the significance of chess  impossibilities,  
which is more nuanced than Dawson and Hundsdorfer report,  see White (1913/1962., 
444–54).
they are blocked, and the position is impossible.12 Here we can suspend judgement 
on  whether  this  means  that  we  should  reject  our  initial  acceptance  of  the 
counterfactual;  in  any  case,  the  standard  semantics  gives  the  verdict  that  the 
counterfactual is vacuously true.13
Once we reach an impossibility like this, we might be interested in evaluating 
whether there are changes to the setup that would make it possible (for example, we 
might realize that  the type of  play that  would follow from an illegal  position is  
interesting  in  a  way  that  we  judge  should  be  allowed).  Since  the  impossibility 
follows from rules about the movement of the chess pieces, and more precisely of a  
subset of those pieces, one might want to exchange those rules for more suitable 
ones. This immediately puts us in the position to consider rules that would deliver 
situations  which  are  strictly  speaking  impossible  in  the  relevant  sense  (chess-
impossible in the case of (4)). There may be several viable variations of the set of 
rules that would yield the wanted result.14 Consider the following counterfactual:
5) If bishops in chess jumped over pieces of their own color once, the bishop in 
g1 would have moved from e3.
Again, the antecedent of this counterfactual is chess-impossible since the bishop in 
chess  does  not  jump over  pieces  of  their  own color.  Conditional  (5)  codifies  a 
change to the rules that would allow a bishop in the  a7-g1 diagonal to reach  g1 
(since the diagonal  h6-c1 is empty, we can allow free movement for the bishop 
from its original position to g1). This might suggest that we should accept (5) as true 
in a way that doesn’t follow automatically from the orthodox vacuity assumption.15
3. Defending the legitimacy of game counterpossibles
There are several ways to handle counterfactuals like these. In this section, I will 
address  several  of  them and argue that  there are reasons to think that  to handle  
12 It is plausible that a seasoned player or problem solver would recognize the impossibility 
of  the  board  visually or  imaginatively instead  of  relying  on  explicit  counterfactual 
reasoning. Cf. the psychological literature on chess cognition tracing back to De Groot 
(1978/2008) and Chase and Simon (1973).
13 On the supposition that the antecedent is indeed impossible; otherwise we have reason to  
think that in the closest worlds, whenever the antecedent is true, the consequent is false, 
so the counterfactual evaluates as false. Suppose that we rejected (4), and moved on to 
judge  that  it  is  false;  our  options  would  be  either  a)  to  reject  the  orthodoxy  about  
counterfactuals, or b) to reject the classification of (4) as a counterfactual conditional. 
Lewis (1973, 24) already considers the possibility that so-called counterpossibles might 
be sui generis, but dismisses it without much comment.
14 We could come up with rules by transposing and varying the movesets of the relevant  
pieces (e.g.,  having the pawns move backwards or sideways) or of other pieces (e.g.,  
having the bishop move like the knight). We could also come up with entirely new move 
ideas; for example, having the bishop wrap around the board (so that it could continue  
from the diagonal  a3-f8 into the diagonal  g1-h2, for example), which no other piece 
does.
15 Does  this  count  against  the  orthodoxy?  We  can  see  the  orthodox  view  as  giving 
explanations for why counterfactuals are true. Does the view have to be committed to  
those  explanations  being  the  only  possible  explanations?  Perhaps  some  true 
counterpossibles are overdetermined as true: vacuously and non-vacuously (this could be 
spelled  out  in  terms  of  counterpossibles  possibly  having  multiple  truthmakers, 
cf. Armstrong  (2004,  21)).  For  a  view that  went  in  this  direction,  it  would  be more 
important to establish the possibility of false counterpossibles, since the orthodoxy does 
not have resources for handling them.
games  counterfactuals  we  have  to  be  able  to  account  for  non-vacuous 
counterpossibles.
Perhaps the  non-vacuity intuition could be  explained  by an ambiguity in  the 
description of the evaluation of the counterfactual. Call the variation of chess that 
has the modification to the rules that we just described, chess*. Since P is a possible  
state of chess*, we can say that the chess-impossibilities of the antecedents of (4) 
and  (5)  are  chess*-possibilities,  so  that  the  judgements  about  the  chess-
impossibilities’ non-vacuity  is  simply  a  reflection  of  the  judgements  about  the 
chess*-possibilities’ non-vacuity (this sort of strategy is used often by defenders of 
orthodoxy).  But  then,  there  should  be  a  worry  that  the  reasonableness  of 
counterpossible-talk relies on changing the subject, and thus on a form of modal 
illusion.  The  idea  would  be  that  in  cases  like  these,  our  acceptance  of  the 
counterfactuals would rely on our acceptance of counterpart counterfactuals about 
similar things which are nonetheless strictly speaking different from the ones we are 
taking the counterfactuals to be about. If bishops in chess jumped over pieces of 
their own color  once, it  wouldn’t  be chess anymore.16 While this might work to 
dismiss counterpossible-talk as  misguided in  a  range of  cases,  it  seems that  this  
strategy of ambiguity elimination cannot be applied so clearly in many game cases.
Take for an example the following chess problem.17 Suppose that the board is as 
follows, and it is white’s turn:
Can white win in one move? According to the current rules  of chess,  this is  
impossible (white cannot capture the king or put it in check in one move). However, 
consider:
6) If white were to promote the pawn in b7 to a black knight in b8, white would 
win in one move.
This  counterfactual  seems  true  for  non-vacuous  reasons  (if  the  white  pawn  is 
promoted to a black knight in b8, the black king is in check from the white rook, and 
can only move to a6 and b6 where it can be captured by the white king). However, 
16 Cf. Kripke (1981, 113–14): “[…] could  this table have been made from a completely 
different block of wood, or even of water hardened into ice[…]? […] thought we can  
imagine making a table  out of  another block of wood or even from ice,  identical  in  
appearance to this one, and though we could have put it in this very position in the room,  
it seems to me that this is not to imagine this table as made of wood or ice, but rather is to 
imagine another table, resembling this one in all external details, made of another block 
of wood, or even of ice.” Cf. Yablo (1993) for a different account of modal error, and 
Yablo (2000) for criticism of so-called “textbook Kripkeanism”. Cf. also Byrne (2007) 
and Stoljar (2006) on ‘proposition confusion’.
17 I take this example from Smullyan (1979, 77). He also comments on a position where it 
is not obvious whether it is possible to castle, that raises similar worries.
according to the current rules for chess, the move described by the antecedent of (6) 
is disallowed because one can only promote a pawn to a piece of its same color. So 
the antecedent of (6) seems to be chess-impossible, and we should treat (6) as a 
chess-counterpossible.  As  we  sketched  above,  one  could  say  that  the  move  is 
possible for the game (call it chess**) with the less restrictive rule for promotion 
where there is no restriction about the color of the promoted pieces, and then explain 
the non-vacuity intuition by reference to the intuition about the chess**-possibility. 
However, it is not obvious that chess** is not chess. It would seem odd to say that 
after that restriction was put in place, the original  game ceased to be and it was 
replaced  by  a  different  game  (from  the  perspective  of  people  endorsing  the 
unrestricted rule, chess would become something else, but from the perspective of 
people endorsing the restricted rule, something turned into chess); rather, it is more 
natural to say that chess itself changed. The problem is not only theoretical, since the 
historical rules of chess actually changed in order to prevent this sort of situation. 18 
The difficulties here lie in the identity conditions for the referent of the term ‘chess’,  
and these difficulties ramify in various directions.
One  immediate  response  might  be  to  notice  that  the  term  ‘chess’  can  be 
equivocal between a broad sense and a narrow sense. In the broad sense, when we 
talk about ‘chess’,  we talk about a  class  of  games that  share similarities (in the 
structure of the board used, the type of pieces, the rules, the goals). In this case we 
also talk of chess  variants.19 In the narrow sense, when we talk about ‘chess’ we 
refer to a specific instance of chess in the broad sense. However, what precisely, is 
that type? The precise reference of the term ‘chess’ when used in the narrow sense 
will vary from context to context: a person talking about chess in a narrow sense 
now could be talking about a different thing than what a person talking about chess 
in a narrow sense a hundred years ago would be talking about. We can expect the 
issues involved in fixing the reference of the term in a given context to be similar to 
those that solving our main problem requires, so the distinction between broad and 
narrow senses of the term is not sufficient.20
A more promising observation is that not all rules for chess will have the same 
role in fixing the reference of the term. While the game supervenes on the rules, the  
identity of the game might not supervene on the set of all the rules that apply to it. If 
so,  then  varying  certain  rules  will  not  yield  chess  impossible  situations,  and 
consequently  counterfactuals  that  involve  variations  to  those  rules  will  not  be 
counterpossibles. One way to implement this strategy is to deploy Searle (1969)’s 
distinction between  constitutive and  regulative rules. The former “create or define 
18 A late 19th century rulebook, Steinitz (1889), states the following promotion rule: “A 
Pawn is ‘queened’ when it has reached the last square of a file on which it is advancing, 
or when it captures a hostile piece on the eight row. It may then be exchanged for a  
Queen or Rook or a Bishop or Knight. Thus, a player may have two or more Queens,  
Rooks, Bishops or Knights on the board at the same time, or he may refuse promotion to 
his Pawn.” (p. xxiv). Note also that the pawn is not obliged to promote.
19 Pritchard (2007) gives a compendium of chess variants, counting more than 1600 games.  
To those we should add variants that  have been created only for the construction of 
problems. In his introduction, John Beasley counts as a variant ‘any game […] related to, 
derived from, or inspired by chess’ (ibid, p. 13), which probably includes too much, but 
he also holds the opinion that strictly speaking ‘true’ chess games keep the goal of the 
game to capture the ‘king’ piece, and distinguishes these from other games that change 
the goal but keep the pieces, and from games that call themselves ‘chess’ but hold no  
resemblance from it whatsoever.
20 There can be a range of senses between the broadest and narrowest. When I talk about  
the narrow sense, because of the contextual sensitivity I already mentioned, I mean the 
variably narrow sense that is sufficient to determine legality for positions.
new forms of behavior”,  while the latter “regulate antecedently or independently 
existing forms of behavior” (ibid, pp. 33–34). The type of rule will determine the 
modal character of facts about the bindingness of the rules (that is, whether they are 
necessarily or contingently binding). Someone who adopted this strategy could rely 
on something like the following plausible sounding principles:
Constitutive Necessity
For some A regulated by a set of rules R, if some r in R is a constitutive rule for 
A, it  is necessary that instances of A must obey r (where the inner necessity,  
which is deontic, is different from the outer necessity).
Regulative Contingency
For some A regulated by a set of rules R, if some r in R is a regulative rule for A,  
it  is  contingent  that  instances  of  A must  obey  r  (that  is,  it  is  possible  that 
instances of A must obey r and it is possible that instances of A are not obliged to 
obey r; again, the inner necessity is not the dual of the outer possibilities).
Given these,  we could say that  counterfactuals about the application of  different 
constitutive  rules  in  the  context  of  a  practice  A are  A-counterpossibles,  while 
counterfactuals  about  the  application  of  different  regulative  rules  have  possible 
antecedents. Rules about the starting positions and basic movement of chess pieces 
seem like good examples of constitutive rules; then, we should count (4) and (5) as  
chess-counterpossibles.  Whether  we  should  count  (6)  as  chess-counterpossible 
depends on whether we count the promotion rule as regulative or constitutive rule. If 
we count the rule as regulative, we should say that (6) is an ordinary counterfactual.  
However, there is a problem with treating the promotion rule as merely regulative. If 
we didn’t have the promotion rule, a whole class of possible chess games would be 
excluded.21 While the rule was adopted independently of the basic rules about the 
movement of the pieces (so it obviously didn’t contribute to the  creation of chess 
playing), it nevertheless  defines what chess games are possible, and how they will 
pan out. This suggests that we should treat any rule that affects the possibility-space 
of chess (defined in this case as the set of possible positions) as a constitutive rule.22 
But  if  so,  we cannot  rely on the  distinction  to  dismiss  the  legitimacy of  chess-
counterpossibles; on the contrary, the problem itself might turn out to be about what 
are the constitutive rules of the game, or what rules can play a constitutive role for 
chess.  I  should make it clear that my point  here isn’t  that  the application of the 
distinction  couldn’t  work  in  any  case;  in  effect,  it  might  be  useful  to  handle 
counterfactuals  about  rules  like  those  of  refereeing  and  tournament  play  (if 
applicable), since rules like those seem to be correctly characterized as regulative. It 
is not correct to say that by refereeing being done in one way or another, the game 
that is being played is different in one case or another. It is also incorrect to say that 
21 It might also mean that the game rules would give no direction about what to do when  
pawns moved to the opposite end of the board, which would make the pawns unique. 
However, historically the promotion rule was not universal.
22 In turn, this seems to indicate that Constitutive Necessity is incorrect at least for games,  
since for at least some rules that could play a constitutive role, there is a possibility where 
instances of the game must obey the rule, without it being necessary that instances of the 
game must obey it. This is compatible with it being necessary that the game obeys some 
of the rules that can constitute it. Alternatively, but at a greater theoretical cost, we could 
keep Constitutive Necessity  but  allow for  incompatible  constitutive rules  to  apply to 
instances of games, in which case we would also need to add a pragmatic story about  
why contextually certain rules are salient instead of others (cf. footnote 5 above).  To 
make the incompatibility more palatable, we could adopt a logic where it can happen that 
‘A is true’, ‘B is true’, but ‘A and B is not true’ (cf.  Lewis (1983, 277) observations on 
the ‘method of union’ for truth in fiction).
amateurs  and  professional  players  play  different  games.  For  those  cases,  the 
distinction  between  regulative  and  constitutive  rules  might  be  useful,  with  the 
appropriate revisions.23
Perhaps,  then,  we  should  treat  some game  counterfactuals  as  genuine 
counterpossibles  (those  we  cannot  rule  out  by  the  simple  application  of  the 
broadness and constitutivity criteria), and try to account for their non-vacuity in a 
less  indirect  way.24 For this,  I  think we should consider  the  functions that  these 
counterpossibles  could  play  in  their  contexts  of  use.  As  we  pointed  out  above, 
ordinary counterfactuals often arise in play because they are needed for planning and 
strategic thinking. On the contrary, we don’t expect counterfactuals like those in our 
examples to arise during normal play (and to be taken as true or false), except in 
cases where our reasoning about play is faulty (for example, to evaluate  as true and 
to move according to the antecedent because one wants to arrive at the consequent 
position  would  be  a  misplay).  Rather,  we  expect  these  counterfactuals  to  be 
evaluated  in  contexts  where  play  is  not  the  point.  In  the  case  of  chess 
counterpossibles there seem to be two contexts where counterpossibles might arise.
The first case is that of retro problems. While they can be interesting from the 
perspective of endgame analysis (and thus implicitly from the perspective of chess 
possibility), they exist independently of play.25 Chess problem solving exists outside 
the institution of play that extends to tournament play, and consequently has entirely 
different  criteria  of  fairness,  and  depending  on  the  setup,  of  what  counts  as  an 
admissible solution.26 This might suggest that the notion of impossibility in use here 
differs systematically from the notion of impossibility in use during play. However, 
in  the  case  of  retro  problems  with  impossible  setups,  the  relevant  notion  of 
impossibility is often the regular one: the point of the problems is to explain the 
illegality of the positions, which is not always obvious. Backtracking to a move and 
position that couldn’t have happened, we reason about intermediate steps that also 
couldn’t have happened. It seems to me that the more flexible way to do this is by 
allowing counterpossible reasoning.
The second case is the evaluation of rules; for example, when faced with issues 
that require a decision on how to implement a rule (due to ambiguity in the rule, or 
because the rule doesn’t handle corner cases). This could be observed above in the 
case  of  the  restricted  and  unrestricted  promotion  rules.  In  regular  play,  finding 
oneself  in an illegal  position indicates that  someone made a mistake or cheated; 
23 How much weight should we give to these intuitions about what counts or not as the 
same game? Couldn’t it be that the ordinary conception of games is incoherent, or that  
alternative conceptions are at least equally good? While these are definite possibilities, in 
the case of games any potential mismatch between their nature and ordinary talk about 
them must  be  treated  with  care,  because  the  constitution  of  games  is  given  by  the 
practices of people who engage in them, including our talk about them. So while these  
intuitions are not infallible, the objection has less bite than usual. However, this line of  
defense of intuitions doesn’t necessarily generalize to cases unlike games.
24 There  might  be  other  ways  to  dismiss  game  counterpossibles  as  non-genuine  that  I 
haven’t  considered.  Here  I  am only  claiming  that  the  lines  of  attack  above  are  not 
sufficient to dismiss them.
25 The problem literature  precedes the existence of  modern chess,  with many medieval 
examples. It is worth mentioning that in some cases problems were embedded in games 
of gambling (cf. Murray (1913, II, ch. VII)).
26 Cf. White (1913/1962, 449) on the construction of problems with illegal positions: “If 
you want to use an extra officer or two, why not do so? There is nothing morally wrong 
about it. Your result will be distasteful to many solvers; but it will do them no harm.” 
White,  of  course,  assumes  the  modern  practice  of  treating  problems  as  intellectual 
exercises, while historically this was not always the case (see footnote 24).
finding oneself in an ambiguous situation, on the other hand, forces an examination 
of the rules, and of the consequences of possible changes to the rules. In those cases  
we want to distinguish between game-impossible scenarios, so we need a way to 
hold the relevant counterfactuals as true or false. Counterpossible reasoning could be 
used here.
In games like chess the practices that can allow for counterpossible reasoning 
and playing are relatively independent. However, this is a contingent feature of these 
practices.  Peter Suber’s ‘nomic’ game illustrates how both practices can be fully 
integrated.27 In nomic, each ‘move’ can consist in the modification of the game’s 
rules. A nomic game starts with a minimal set of rules about how the players should 
proceed, and specifies how rule changes can be incorporated (by default there is a 
‘democratic’ mechanism where a player proposes rules and the other players either 
accept or reject the proposal). Given these facts about the game, what can be nomic-
possible  and  nomic-impossible  is  much  less  clear  than  in  the  case  of  chess 
possibility and impossibility (with suitable changes, the sphere of possibilities at any 
stage can grow and shrink widely). While one could say that everything is nomic-
possible and nothing is nomic-impossible, these are  not the notions of possibility 
and impossibility that  would be used in counterfactual  strategic reasoning during 
actual nomic play, which would be the proper counterparts of the notion of chess-
possibility and chess-impossibility that we examined earlier. Thus, there might be a 
need  for  the  evaluation  of  counterfactuals  about  genuine  nomic-impossibilities. 
Admittedly,  one  could  adopt  the  possibilist  view according  to  which  everything 
whatsoever is nomic possible, and supplement it with a pragmatic account that filters 
out  irrelevancies.  However,  given  the  context  sensitivity  of  counterfactuals,  this 
might  underutilize  the  resources  that  the  context  provides  to  determine  their 
semantic content.28 While we still get a liberal account of entertainable ‘situations’ or 
‘worlds’ (that includes impossibilities  stricto sensu), we have an ‘inner’ notion of 
possibility that we can then use to pragmatically rule out irrelevancies in context.
My proposal  to understand counterpossible talk in the context of games (and 
perhaps more generally) can be sketched as follows. Games of the type we have 
discussed here supervene on rules.29 If  you change the rules too much, you start 
playing  a  different  or  divergent  game.  But  before  that  happens,  you  will  have 
potential variations that still count as the same game as we have been playing all  
along.  What  counts  as  merely a  variation and  what  counts  as  a  divergent  game 
depends on criteria which are given in the context, and which are themselves subject 
to revision. In practice, surrounding or embedded in the game proper there is always 
a meta-game (or a collection of meta-games) that deals with managing revisions of 
this sort. It seems like counterpossible-talk can play a crucial role here, because it 
offers a way to express and discuss the consequences of adopting variant rules while 
keeping the distinction between variants and divergencies using a constant modal 
conceptual framework. Chess-impossibility stands in a relation to chess-possibility 
that  chess*-possibility  does  not  stand  in  relation  to  chess-possibility.  While 
counterpossibles are context sensitive, they don’t shift the modal framework in use 
27 Suber (1990). For a multi-player chess variant of nomic, see Howe (2000).
28 The  case  of  nomic  is  important  because  it  puts  pressure  on  the  idea  that  we  could 
understand  the  possibility  of  non-vacuous  counterpossible-talk  in  terms  of  a  sharp 
distinction  between  object  languages  and  meta-languages  for  games  (where 
counterpossibles are vacuous at the object level and possibly non-vacuous at the meta-
level).
29 Cf. Kreider (2011) for discussion of the relation between rules and games, and Ridge  
(2019) for an overview of the philosophical literature on the nature of games.
implicitly.30 If they did, they would be pointless in many cases, since they would 
change the subject too radically. Even when they don’t change the subject, they can 
still be pointless in cases where the task at hand is to evaluate courses of actions, 
since it is doubtful that they could be of direct use for guidance.31 This is why we 
don’t find them in play. Instead of giving a pragmatic account of the acceptability of 
counterpossibles,  we  should  also  be  able  to  give  a  pragmatic  account  of  the 
restrictions  that  we  make  in  ordinary  contexts  to  counterfactuals  with  possible 
antecedents (in which case instead of having a restricted default semantics which is 
pragmatically extended, we have a liberal default semantics which is pragmatically 
restricted).32
4. Divide and conquer, or normativist subsumption?
It can be useful to contrast the current proposal in its general form with two recent  
views: Vetter’s (2016) ‘divide and conquer’ strategy, and Locke’s (2019) normativist 
account.
Vetter’s (2016) aim is to defend the orthodoxy about counterpossibles using what 
she calls a ‘divide and conquer’ strategy, by distinguishing between cases where 
counterpossibles should be vacuous, and cases where they might not be. Arguably, 
the current proposal shares this ‘divide and conquer’ structure, although it draws the 
division between admissible and inadmissible cases differently.
The  crux  of  Vetter’s  argument  lies  on  the  distinction  she  makes  between 
epistemic and circumstantial modality, which she contrasts as follows:
[…]  circumstantial  modality  concerns  the  objects,  properties,  and 
relations that a given claim is about, not [like in the epistemic case] any 
representational  or  cognitive features of  the terms we use to  refer  to 
them. (p. 2698)
With  this  distinction  in  hand,  she  proceeds  to  argue  that  non-vacuous  seeming 
counterfactuals are always epistemic. The reason for this is that they would give rise 
to referential opacity, which gives evidence for an epistemic reading. This suggests 
that  in  the  cases  of  seemingly  non-vacuous  game  counterpossibles  we  have 
considered, the non-vacuity intuition can be explained away by proposing epistemic 
readings for the counterfactuals. Note that Vetter’s view is not that counterpossibles 
are always vacuous, but that circumstantial counterpossibles always are.
However, this does not seem plausible in the case of the counterfactuals that we 
have  considered.  They  are  explicitly  not  about  the  representational  features  of 
games, or of our epistemic situation relative to them. They are about what would 
30 This assumes a more or less traditional contextualist view. Ludlow (2014) offers a more 
dynamic view along similar lines, where the meaning of terms can change between and  
within conversations (cf. his chapter 5 specially on how he addresses troubles for his 
account). Like in the current proposal, Ludlow emphasizes the practices of negotiation of 
meaning  and  concepts.  Unlike  in  the  current  proposal,  in  Ludlow’s  proposal  the 
negotiation is purely metalinguistic, while I think it might have to do with the open-
endedness of the referents of terms as well (in the case of games, the open-endedness of 
our conceptualizations is grounded on the open-endedness nature of games).
31 However, see Heuer (2010). In any case, counterpossible talk in the uses I describe here 
could  be  indirectly  of  use  because  in  some  cases  guidance  requires  changes  to  the  
operative modal framework.
32 We don’t need to choose: my point is that we have both strategies available instead of 
just the first.
happen or would have happened in the context of games. This is a circumstantial 
subject  matter,  and  the  corresponding  modalities  should  be  correspondingly 
circumstantial.33
Locke (2019) offers  a  theory of  counterpossibles  that  applies  a  more general 
modal normativist framework to the case of counterpossibles. Modal normativism is 
the view that the primary function of modal claims is expressive or normative.34 The 
basic idea is that modal claims, in Brandom’s turn of phrase, ‘make explicit’ the 
rules of use of our terms. Thomasson (2007) describes modal normativism about 
metaphysical necessity as the view that modal claims about necessity
[...] serve the prescriptive function of expressing semantic rules for the 
terms used in them, or their consequences, while remaining in the object 
language. (p. 136)
The last point is an important similarity between the modal normativist view and the 
current  proposal.  As  I  said  before,  if  we  are  to  accept  seemingly  non-vacuous 
counterpossibles, we should be careful not to change the subject. The goal of having 
modal  language  belong  to  the  object  language  is  precisely  to  avoid  this  issue.  
Consequently, modal normativist views do not have the problem that I raised for 
Vetter’s account concerning the subject matter of counterpossibles.
Locke states normativism about counterpossibles as follows:
[…]  metaphysical  counterpossibles  function  to  illustrate  or  express 
changes, or consequences of changes, to the actual constitutive rules that 
govern language use while remaining in the object language where terms 
are used rather than mentioned. (p. 8)
This  follows  the  constraint  we  raised  before  that  if  there  are  genuine  game 
counterpossibles, at least some (if not all) of those should relate to constitutive rules.  
A further similarity between Locke’s view and the current proposal is the way Locke 
deals with the problem of changing the subject:
I claim that, since object language claims about metaphysical necessities 
and possibilities illustrate the actual rules or permissions that govern the 
use  of  modal  vocabulary,  object  language  claims  about  non-trivial 
metaphysical impossibilities illustrate non-trivial changes in those rules 
and  permissions.  In  the  right  context,  claims  about  non-trivial 
metaphysical impossibilities are an important object language resource 
for “mis-using” language without being subject to rebuke or interpreted 
as incompetent, e.g.  in the case of a charitable philosophical  dispute. 
This is because small, relevant changes in the actual rules that govern 
the  use  of  some  expression  neither  result  in  a  radically  different 
expression nor do they result in a complete change of subject. (p. 11)
The current proposal manages to tell roughly the same story without having modal 
language  as  a  whole  play  a  normative  or  expressive  function.  Perhaps 
representational  language is  normative  or  expressive,  but  that  is  an  even  greater 
departure from orthodoxy that we are not forced to make just for the sake of being 
33 Locke (2019) raises the same criticism about the scope of Vetter’s strategy, giving as a 
counterexample the counterfactual ‘if a steel Penrose triangle were placed in a 4000 deg. 
F oven, it would melt.’
34 Cf. Brandom (2008) and Thomasson (2007, 2013)
able  to  handle  counterpossibles.  This  aspect  of  the  normativist  proposal  is 
underplayed by Locke because of his underlying commitment to normativism about 
modality  in  general,  but  in  the  present  context  the  issue  is  more  pronounced.  
Furthermore, modal normativism depends on having an account of the adequacy of 
the  constitutive  rules  of  language  use  (thus,  Thomasson  (2007,  138)  says  that  
normativism ‘requires that we first accept that our terms  have rules of use’). That 
makes  the  possibility  of  contexts  where  counterpossibles  are  used  to  discuss 
potential  revisions to those very same rules a bit  awkward; this seems to be the 
reason  why,  in  the  (2007)  paper,  she  claims  that  under  normativism  there  are 
substantive limitations about what kind of revisionary projects can be undertaken. In 
recent work (2017), Thomasson introduces the idea that metalinguistic negotiations 
might have non-semantic consequences, which allows for more revisionary projects; 
Locke (2019) adopts this solution. The solution in the current proposal is that the 
appropriateness of counterpossibles depends on the features of the local context, not 
of global standards of use (of course, the local context might in turn refer back to 
broader  standards).  This  means  that  disputes  about  counterpossibles  might  not 
necessarily be resolved definitely through conceptual analysis, like Locke suggests 
(p. 20); indeed, they might only be resolved temporarily or not at all.35
Appendix: Chess possibility
Semi-formally, a board b is chess-possible iff it can be reached in any umber of steps 
by the application of chess-rules R, from a starting board s.
A diagram is a sentence describing the complete state of a board (essentially the 
information encoded in a FEN string). We will work in a language with variables for 
diagrams (p1...pn),  two constants:  i for  the current diagram and  s for the starting 
diagram, and three modal operators:  ◇→,  ◇←,  and ◇s  that build sentences out of 
sentences. The informal interpretation of these operators is 'it is possible to advance 
to position...', 'it is possible to have come from position...' and 'it is chess possible 
that...',  respectively.  We  also  have  the  usual  negation  and  the  connectives for 
conjunction, disjunction, and material implication.
A  chess-frame is  a  4-tuple  <W,  s,  R→,  R←>,  where  W is  a  set  of  possible 
(constructible)  boards,  s  is  a  selected  member  of  W that  represents  the  starting 
position, R→ is a binary relation over W, and R← is another binary relation over W. 
We  use  two  binary  relations  instead  of  one  because  we  want  to  track  more 
perspicuously (1) what moves can be made legally from a position (this is what R→ 
tracks) and (2) what moves could have been made legally to arrive at a position (this 
is what R← tracks), and some moves in chess are not reversible (the pawns can only 
move forward). R→ and R← can be understood as the converse of each other, so 
that R→ ab ↔ R←ba.36It is worth noting that neither relation is reflexive (it is not 
possible  to  make  a  move  that  doesn't  change  the  state  of  the  board),  but  both 
relations are transitive (if it is possible to arrive from one direction at a position A 
from a position B, and it is possible to arrive from the same direction at a position B 
35 I would like to thank the reviewers for their suggestions, and Jan Heylen, Lars Tump and 
Kristine Grigoryan for their feedback on earlier versions of the paper. 
36 We implicitly  assume that  we track information about  the players  and the turns (for  
example, to prevent white to move twice in a row, or--in some variants—to allow for 
such things). A different approach would be to have one the frames be a triple <W, s, R> 
where R is  a  set  of  binary relations over  W where each represents  a  possible  move  
according to a rule.
from a position C, it is possible to arrive from the same direction to A from C). We 
extend frames with a function I that assigns a unique diagram to every board in W to 
obtain a  chess-model (a  different  way to present  this  would be  to  make boards 
themselves diagrams, and to let diagrams represent themselves).
We define a valuation VM for a model M as a function that assigns truth values (0 
or 1) to each well-formed-formula to each member of W as follows, where δ is any 
diagram, φ and ψ are any wffs, and w is any board:
VM(δ, w) = 1 iff δ = I(w)
VM(¬φ, w) = 1 iff VM(φ, w) = 0
VM(φ→ψ, w) = 1 iff VM(φ, w) = 0 or VM(ψ, w) = 1
VM(◇→φ, w) = 1 iff for some w'∈W with R→ww', VM(φ,w') = 1
VM(◇← φ, w) = 1 iff for some w'∈W with R← ww', VM(φ,w') = 1
VM(◇sφ, w) = 1 iff φ = I(s) or VM(◇→φ, s) = 1
For the three modal operators, there is a derived notion of necessity that is their 
dual.  There  are  four  types  of  possibility  in  the  model:  a)  the  combinatorial 
possibility  of  diagrams,  which  is  assumed  for  W in  the  frames,  b)  the  forward 
looking  possibility  ◇→,  c)  the  backwards  looking  possibility  ◇←  ,  and  c)  the 
composite ◇s, which is what we call chess-possibility properly speaking. Because of 
this, the model includes worlds which are constructible and sharply distinguishable, 
but impossible in a definite sense, without a need to mark those explicitly.
◇sφ & ◇→φ → ◇si is  a  non-theorem: there can be positions that  can move 
towards chess-possible positions that couldn't have come from the standard position. 
On the other hand, if we can advance to an impossible position, the current position 
is impossible:  ¬◇sφ & ◇→φ → ¬◇si.  In  this model,  some impossible positions 
share with the starting position the property of being terminal nodes: there is no 
position that they could have come from. But it is clear that in many cases we want  
to reason about illegal positions that derive from legal positions through misplay. To 
model  this,  we  should  introduce  additional  accessibility  relations  that  models 
transitions from positions through mistakes (forwards and backwards, like above). In 
the system extended in this way we can reason backwards from impossible positions 
to positions that caused the illegality.
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